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How Are You Going to Keep

Them Down on the (Collective)

Farm After They've Seen Chicago?-

A Minor's Right to Political Asylum
Against His Parents' Wishes
MICHAEL G. HILLINGER*
INTRODUCTION

On July 30, 1980, an all-too-common drama played itself out
in a Chicago juvenile courtroom.' Judge Mooney decided the case
of a twelve-year-old boy who had run away from home because he
objected to his parents' decision to move out of state. Judge Mooney
heard testimony from the boy, his older sister (with whom he had
run away), his parents and several psychiatrists. On August 4, Judge
Mooney announced his decision: he found the boy's running away
sufficient to support a finding that he was beyond his parents' control. The judge therefore declared the boy to be a minor in need of
supervision (MINS)2 and made him a ward of the court. Pending a
dispositional hearing to determine the boy's ultimate fate, he was
placed in the temporary care of foster parents. Taking advantage of
a procedural technicality, the boy's parents appealed on the day that
the dispositional hearing was to have taken place. On December 30,
1981, a three judge panel of the First District of the Appellate Court
of Illinois reversed Judge Mooney's decision. 3 In a narrowly written
* Law Clerk to the Hon. Walter E. Hoffman, Senior Judge, United States
District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia. A.B., University of Pennsylvania,
1964; A.M., Columbia University, 1967, Ph.D., 1973; J.D., College of William &
Mary, 1983. I am grateful to Professors Frederick Schauer and Elizabeth Schmidt for
their criticisms of an earlier version of this article and for their encouragement to
revise it for publication.
1. For a general background to the case, see In re Polovchak, 97 Ill. 2d 212,
454 N.E.2d 258 (1983); In re Polovchak, 104 Il1.App. 3d 203, 432 N.E.2d 873 (1981);
Brief for Minor-Respondent, In re Polovchak, 104 Ill. App. 3d 203, 432 N.E.2d
873 (1981) [hereinafter cited as Polovchak Brief]. The case has also been extensively
covered in the N.Y. Times and Washington Post. For a recent, surprisingly balanced
summary see Thorne, The Littlest Defector, 35 NAT'L REV. 314 (1983).
2. As defined in ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 37, § 702-3 (1981) (amended 1983).
3. In re Polovchak, 104 Ill. App. 3d 203, 432 N.E.2d 873 (1981).
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opinion, the appellate court held that a single instance of running
away was insufficient evidence to support a finding that the boy was
beyond his parents' control and therefore a MINS.4 The Illinois
Supreme Court affirmed this decision.
Based on the bare recitation of its facts, this case seems little
more than another example of the increasingly common spectacle of
families turning to the courts to resolve seemingly intractable conflicts.
In fact, this case raises complex questions of federalism and foreign
power. 6 Its ultimate resolution will depend on the extent of judicial
willingness to recognize that children have rights beyond those their
parents deign to give them and that "neither the Fourteenth Amendment nor the Bill of Rights is for adults alone."' Understanding why
such a basically simple case has been featured on the CBS News,
in the New York Times and the Washington Post, and has involved
at least five lawyers from the Illinois Civil Liberties Union representing the parents, requires some background information.
In January, 1980, Mikhail and Anna Polovchak and their three
children, Natasha (Natalie), Vladimir (Walter) and Mikhail arrived
in the United States. 8 Ukrainians and devout Christians, the Polovchaks had long wanted to leave the Soviet Union, but had been unable
to receive exit visas. No Soviet citizen may travel abroad without one.
Late in 1979, Soviet authorities finally granted the Polovchaks permission to leave their home in the western Ukraine and to emigrate
4. Id. at 211, 432 N.E.2d at 880. This holding can best be described as surreal. The court based its decision almost entirely on the testimony of the parents'
expert witness, a psychiatrist who admitted that he had never talked to Walter and
did not know the background of the Polovchak family relationships, yet was willing
to state dogmatically that "no twelve year old has the intellectual or emotional capacity
to decide whether he should live with his parents." Id. at 205-06, 432 N.E.2d at
875-77. The court dealt with none of the substantive issues raised in a year and
a half of litigation. It merely told Walter to run away at least one more time. The
dissent argued that the majority had misconstrued Illinois law and had misapplied
it to the facts in this case. Id. at 211-13, 432 N.E.2d at 880-81 (McNamara, J., dissenting). Justice McNamara felt that there was ample evidence to support a finding that
Walter was beyond his parents' control and that the lower court's judgment should
have been affirmed.
5. In re Polovchak, 97 Ill. 2d 212, 226, 454 N.E.2d 258, 264 (1983).
6. For some recent scholarly examinations of the issue of federal preemption,
see J.NowAK, R. ROTUNDA & J. YoUNG, HANDBOOK ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 292-96
(2d ed. 1983); Shiply, Publicity Never Dies; It Just Fades Away: The Right of Publicity
and Federal Preemption, 66 CORNELL L. REV. 673 (1981); Comment, Pre-empting
State Action Taken Pursuant to the Twenty-First Amendment, 53 TEMP. L.Q. 590,
595-601 (1980).
7. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 13 (1967).
8. In re Polovchak, 97 Ill. 2d at 215, 454 N.E.2d at 259.
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to the United States. The Polovchaks settled in a large Ukrainian community in Chicago. They shared an apartment there with Mikhail's
nephew, Walter Polovchak.
The Polovchaks were part of a recent upsurge of Soviet immigrants to the United States. 9 During the mid-1970's, due in part
'
to the Jackson-Vanik Amendment" and the Helsinki Accord, the
Soviet Union significantly liberalized its emigration policies. Since 1974,
it has allowed over 40,000 Soviet citizens to emigrate to the United
States. Although this stream of Soviet immigration is miniscule compared to the arrival into the United States of three million legal immigrants during the same period,' 2 several aspects of this immigration
have caught media attention. The media, especially television, have
focused on Jewish dissidents and Russian intellectuals, artists, athletes,
and musicians: on writers such as Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn, ballet
dancers such as Mikhail Baryshnikov, musicians such as Mstislav
Rostopovich and skaters such as the Protopoviches. Yet most of the
Soviet emigration was made up of more ordinary people, often
members of minorities: Ukrainians, Lithuanians and Armenians as
well as Jews.' 3 The Polovchaks, neither intellectuals nor famous, were
more typical of the 40,000 immigrants than was Rudolf Nureyev.
Mr. Polovchak had been a bus driver in Lviv. 4 When the Polov9. See UNITED STATES BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE
UNITED STATES: 1980, at 94 (1980) [hereinafter cited as STATISTICAL ABSTRACT].
10. The Jackson-Vanik Amendment linked any future United States trade concessions to the Soviet Union to a public Soviet commitment to liberalize its emigration policies, especially for Jews. Although the Soviets never accepted the Amendment formally, they did liberalize their emigration policies until 1979. The growing
chill in U.S.-Soviet relations that resulted from the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan
and the American reaction to it significantly affected Soviet willingness to allow large
numbers of Soviet citizens to emigrate. See P. STERN, WATER'S EDGE: DOMESTIC
POLICY AND THE MAKING OF AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY (1979) for a recent study
on the impact of the issue of Soviet emigration on U.S.-Soviet relations.
11. The Helsinki Accord essentially recognizes the territorial status quo resulting
from the Communist takeovers in Central Europe between 1945 and 1948. Part of
the price the Soviets paid for this Western acceptance of the Soviet Bloc was the
so-called "Basket III" of Helsinki, committing the signatories to the protection of
such basic rights as the right to enter and leave the country of one's birth at will.
See generally Turack, Freedom of Transnational Movement: The Helsinki Accord
and Beyond, 11 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 585 (1978); Human Rights and the Helsinki
Accord-A Five-Year Road to Madrid, 13 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 249 (1980).
12. STATISTICAL ABSTRACT, supra note 9.
13. Immigration law gives a strong preference to close relatives of American
citizens (8 U.S.C. § 1153(a)(5) (1965)) and since those four nationalities comprise
the bulk of Americans whose ancestors came from what is now the Soviet Union,
it is likely that most recent Soviet immigrants to the U.S. also come from those groups.
14. N.Y. Times, Aug. 14, 1981, at A3, col. 1.
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chaks arrived in the United States, they could find only menial employment. Both Polovchak parents worked as janitors, but on different
shifts, the father from 3 P.M. to midnight and the mother from 7
A.M. to 3 P.M. The father was home only when the children were
asleep or getting ready to go to school. Only the mother was able
to spend significant amounts of time with the children. According

to Walter's testimony at trial, his parents went away on weekends,
frequently leaving their three children with cousin Walter."

It would be hard to overestimate the tensions and dislocations
of the Polovchaks' life style in the United States. They had become

a fairly typical working-class immigrant family." The parents worked
at low-paying, physically draining jobs which left little opportunity
to gain an understanding or liking of American life. Their children,
on the other hand, were becoming Americanized and probably in-

creasingly estranged from their parents. Walter and Natalie's increas-

ing closeness to their "American" cousin, Walter, also exacerbated
the situation. Unlike his Ukrainian cousins, Walter was not a member
of the Ukrainian Catholic Church," but a Baptist.' 8 Natalie and young

Walter increasingly attended the neighborhood Ukrainian Baptist
Church with their cousin. The older Polovchak children repeatedly

fought with their father on the few occasions that they saw him. Some
of the arguments concerned religion, but many centered around young
Walter's taste in music.
15. Polovchak Brief, supra note 1, at 26.

16. See UNITED STATES COMM'N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, CwVL RIGHTS OF EURO-ETHNIC
AMERICANS IN THE UNITED STATES: OPPORTUNITIES AND CHALLENGES (1979), especially

at 396-488 for an indication that even native Americans of southern and eastern

European extraction tend to be represented disproportionally in unskilled and semiskilled occupations.
17. The Ukrainian Catholic Church is part of a larger movement known as

Eastern Rite Catholicism or the Uniates. Like other Uniates, Ukrainian Catholics
follow the same liturgy and theology as the majority Ukrainian Orthodox; unlike

the Orthodox, the Uniates also acknowledge the supremacy of the Pope. The Ukrainian Uniates are strongest in the western Ukraine, especially in areas which became
Soviet only after 1945. The Soviet government dissolved the Uniate Church in the
Ukraine after 1945, but an underground Uniate movement still exists. For a recent
survey pointing out the continued importance of the Uniates in Ukrainian nationalism,
see Bociurkiw, Religion and Nationalism in the Contemporary Ukraine, in NATIONALISM
IN THE USSR & EASTERN EUROPE IN THE ERA OF BREZHNEV & KOSYGIN 81-96
(G. Simmonds ed. 1977).
18. The Ukrainian Baptist Church seems in large part to have originated among
the underground Uniates. Id. at 87. In spite of (or perhaps because of) this common
origin, relations between Uniates and Baptists are often poor. In fact, Walter's father

put much of the blame for Walter's defection on Baptists. Richmond Times-Dispatch,
April 29, 1982, at A8, col. 6.
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The Polovchak's residence with cousin Walter heightened the tensions in the Polovchak family. Cousin Walter supported young Walter
in many of his arguments with his father. Mikhail Polovchak began
to regret having left the Soviet Union and, in early July, he started
to talk seriously about returning. 9 This intention caused even more
arguments with his older children.
The crisis in the Polovchak family came to a head in mid-July.
On July 12, cousin Walter moved into his own apartment. On July
13, Natalie and Walter went to church with their cousin and spent
the night at his new apartment. The following day they left their apartment with their belongings, refusing to tell their mother where they
were going. By July 18, the police had tracked Walter and Natalie
down. Judge Mooney held a preliminary hearing on Walter's case
the next day, appointing temporary foster parents" pending adjudication of Walter's status.
At this point, the already complex case began to resemble a threering circus. The Illinois Civil Liberties Union entered on the parents'
side. Young Walter acquired two lawyers, one, a guardian ad litem
appointed by the court, the other, Julian Kulas, a leader in Chicago's
Ukrainian community.2" The Soviet Embassy in Washington also
became involved, muttering darkly about drugging and kidnapping
plots and explaining the whole incident as an attempt to wreck what
was left of detente.2 2 Even the Reagan Administration got into the
drama, granting Walter's request for political asylum with almost indecent haste.2 3 Walter had requested asylum on the day of the
preliminary hearing and the State Department granted it two days
later, two weeks before Judge Mooney decided Walter's MINS status.24
By early August, many of the participants in the drama and much
of the commentary were ignoring the human question of a family
torn apart by forces beyond their control. The parents especially seemed
hurt, angry and bewildered. At the trial, Mrs. Polovchak asked: " 'Do
we lose our rights as parents because we came to the United States?' ""
Two weeks earlier, upon hearing that the State Department had granted
his son political asylum, Mr. Polovchak asked: " 'Am I a drunkard?
19. Washington Post, Aug. 10, 1980, at Al, col. 5.
20. These temporary parents were Walter's aunt and uncle, cousin Walter's
parents. Polovchak Brief, supra note 1, at 29-30.
21. N.Y. Times, July 22, 1980, at A12, col. 1.
22. Id., Aug. 13, 1980, at A13, col. 1.
23. Id., July 22, 1980, at A12, col. 1.
24. Polovchak Brief, supra note 1, at 18.
25. N.Y. Times, July 31, 1980, at A12, col. 3.
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I am not. Do I starve my children? I do not. Have I broken any
laws? I have not. So who is the government to take away my child?' "26
Mr. Polovchak's last question forms the crux of his case and
his lawyers' arguments. Most people, especially parents, would
probably answer his question by denying the government's legal or
moral right to take away his child. As is frequently the case, however,
the answer one gives depends in large part on the question that is
asked. Had Walter Polovchak been interviewed by the same reporter,
he might have asked a very different question: "Who is my father
to force me to go back to a country where I will be unhappy, unable
to get higher education and perhaps even be sent to a prison camp?"
Walter deserves an answer just as much as his father does. This article focuses on which question, Walter's or his father's, is the one
the courts should address.
PARENTAL AUTONOMY AND CHILDREN'S RIGHTS

"Children's rights" is a nebulous phrase subsuming two very different issues: the extent to which children can assert the same rights
against the state as adults, and the extent to which the state can limit
a parent's power over his child.2" In cases involving the issue of
children's rights, the Supreme Court has defined those rights in a
relatively restrictive fashion. On the one hand, the Supreme Court
has recognized that children have constitutional rights independent
of those enjoyed by their parents.2 8 On the other hand, it has frequently held those rights to be either less than those afforded to adults
or subordinate to the rights of the parents.2 9 A recent opinion listed
26. Id., July 22, 1980, at A12, col. 1.
27. See generally Richards, The Individual, the Family, and the Constitution:
A Jurisprudential Perspective, 55 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1 (1980); Developments in the
Law-The Constitution and the Family, 93 HARv. L. REV. 1156 (1980); Note, State
Intrusion into Family Affairs: Justifications and Limitations, 26 STAN. L. REV. 1383
(1974).
28. See, e.g., Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 574-75 (1975) (public high school

students facing temporary suspension have liberty and property interests protectable
under due process clause of fourteenth amendment); Tinker v. Des Moines Indep.
School Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 506 (1969) (school children have first amendment rights
of freedom of speech and expression); In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 30-31 (1967) (minor

in juvenile delinquency hearing has fourteenth amendment procedural due process
rights).
29. See, e.g., Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 600 (1979) (child's liberty interest

in-not being institutionalized by his parents in a state mental hospital "is inextricably
linked with the parents' interest in and obligation for the welfare and health of the
child, [so] the private interest at stake is a combination of the child's and parents'
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three reasons why children could not enjoy the same constitutional
rights as adults: children's "peculiar vulnerability . . , ; their inability
to make critical decisions in an informed, mature manner; and the
importance of the parental role in child rearing.''30 To the extent that
the courts have recognized children's rights, they generally have done
so within the context of a parental right to "family autonomy."
FAMILY AUTONOMY-THE CASE-LAW BASIS

Family autonomy evolved from the turn-of-the-century doctrine
of substantive due process, generally associated with Lochner v. New
York. 3 The United States Supreme Court read certain substantive
rights into the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment and
struck down a number of state regulatory statutes because they infringed upon these rights.3 2 By the end of the 1930's, however, the
Court had largely repudiated substantive due process, once again allowing states to enforce minimum wages for women or regulate the working hours of bakers.33
The Court's repudiation of Lochner did not affect several lines
of cases which held that the fourteenth amendment's due process clause
imposed an obligation on the states to respect certain non-economic
rights of their citizens.3 4 Two opinions in one of these lines provided
the foundation upon which the Supreme Court later constructed a
theory of family autonomy.

concerns"); Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651 (1977) (eighth amendment right to
be free from cruel and unusual punishment does not apply to disciplinary corporal
punishment in public schools, id. at 669-71; post-deprivation, common law remedies
adequately protect child's fourteenth amendment due process interests, id. at 677-80);
Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 167-71 (1944) (child's first amendment free
exercise right subject to greater state restriction than that of adult).
30. Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 634 (1979).
31. 198 U.S. 45 (1905) (invalidated a state law limiting the number of hours
a baker could work). This case represented the classic incorporation of the free enterprise ideology of the Chamber of Commerce into the fourteenth amendment.
32. For a discussion of the origins and evolution of substantive due process,

see J. NowAK, R.

ROTUNDA

& J. YOUNG,

supra note 6, at 425-43.

33. In West Coast Hotel v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937), the Court sustained
the constitutionality of a Washington state minimum wage statute for women, marking the end of substantive due process in the area of state regulation designed to
limit business freedom.
34. See, e.g., Nixon v. Herndon, 273 U.S. 536 (1927) (invalidating Texas "white
primary" statute as violating fourteenth amendment); Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S.
652 (1925) (applying first amendment freedom of speech protection to the states via
incorporation into the fourteenth amendment).

NORTHERN ILLINOIS UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

Meyer v. Nebraska" and Pierce v. Society of Sisters arose in
the context of an extreme reaction against foreigners, Jews, Catholics
and radicals during and shortly after World War L" Many "Native

Americans" (primarily those of British Protestant extraction) feared
that they would be swamped by an ever-increasing horde of
foreigners." Congress reacted to this fear in part by imposing severely
restrictive immigration quotas. 9 Many states passed statutes intended
to strengthen the traditional role of the public schools as assimilator
and Americanizer of immigrant children.' In 1919, Nebraska, like
many other states, prohibited the teaching of foreign languages to

children before high school." Meyer, a teacher in a Lutheran parochial

school, violated the statute and was prosecuted and convicted. The

Nebraska Supreme Court affirmed the conviction."'

On appeal, the United States Supreme Court reversed, striking
down the statute for violating Meyer's fourteenth amendment right
to carry on his chosen profession."' Two years later, the Court in
Pierce struck down an Oregon statute which mandated public school
35. 262 U.S. 390 (1923).
36. 268 U.S. 510 (1925).

37. 2 0. HANDLIN, THE HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES, 339-40 (1968). Handlin
includes an excerpt from a Des Moines, Iowa, newspaper decrying the "insidious
German propaganda that has been woven into our whole educational system" and
calling, inter alia, for the purification of American music from German influences.
Id.at 339.
38. Id. at 354-57.
39. See id. at 357 for charts showing the impact of the new immigration quotas
on immigration into the United States.
40. The anti-immigrant animus of the statutes struck down in Meyer and Pierce
becomes clear from reading the lower court opinions. Both majority and dissent in
Meyer agreed on the legislature's motive. "The legislature had seen the baneful effects
of permitting foreigners . . .to rear and educate their children in the language of
their native land." Meyer v. State, 107 Neb. 657, 661, 187 N.W. 100, 102 (1922), rev'd,
262 U.S. 390 (1923). "It is patent, obvious, and a matter of common knowledge
that this restriction was . . .a product of passions engendered by the World War,
which had not [yet) had time to cool." Id. at 669, 187 N.W. at 104-05 (Letton,
J., dissenting). Similarly, the three judge federal panel whose opinion the Supreme
Court affirmed in Pierce noted (and dismissed) Oregon's argument that the state
had a valid interest in banning private schools in order to keep them from hindering
the assimilation of immigrants' children. Society of Sisters v. Pierce, 296 F. 928,
938 (D. Or. 1924), aff'd, 268 U.S. 510 (1925).
41. See Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 395 (1923) (partial list of states with
such statutes).
42. Meyer v. State, 107 Neb. 657, 187 N.W. 100 (1922), rev'd, 262 U.S. 390
(1923).
43. Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923). In a companion case, the Court
overturned an Iowa law forbidding the teaching of foreign languages. Bartels v. Iowa,
262 U.S. 404 (1923).
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attendance for all children aged eight to sixteen who had not yet
finished the eighth grade." As in Meyer, the Court found that the
statute violated the appellants' right to carry on their business.
Although both Meyer and Pierce were decided strictly on substantive due process grounds, 5 each contained a wealth of dictum supporting a constitutional guarantee of parental rights. In Meyer, the
Court suggested that the fourteenth amendment embraced the right
to "marry, establish a home and bring up children [which are] essential to the ordered pursuit of liberty.""' , In Pierce, the Court rejected
the notion that a child was "the mere creation of the State"4 7 and
asserted the parents' fourteenth amendment right "to direct the upbringing and education of children under their control."4 8
For four decades, the Court largely ignored the language in Meyer
and Pierce giving constitutional protection to parental rights. The two
cases were cited infrequently and almost never for their language on
parental rights. 9 In 1965, the Supreme Court revived substantive due
44. Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925). The last of the cases
invalidating statutes restricting or prohibiting private schools was Farrington v.
Tokushige, 273 U.S. 284 (1926). Tokushige invalidated a territorial statute of Hawaii
for violating the fifth amendment's due process clause. The Hawaii statute essentially
banned private schools which used Japanese, Chinese and other foreign languages.
45. The importance of substantive due process in deciding these cases is clearest
in Pierce, where the district court liberally quoted from Meyer v. Nebraska yet made
no mention at all of the parents' (or the children's) rights or interests. The cases
focused exclusively on the teacher's right to teach (Meyer v. State) and the private
school's right to carry on its business (Society of Sisters v. Pierce).
46. Meyer, 262 U.S. at 399.
47. Pierce, 268 U.S. at 535.
48. Id. at 534-35.
49. Before Lochner was overruled in 1937, Meyer and Pierce were cited most
often in string cites upholding the validity of the Lochner doctrine. See, e.g., Seattle
Trust Co. v. Roberge, 278 U.S. 116, 121 (1928); Liggett Co. v. Baldridge, 278 U.S.
105, 113 (1928); Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 372-73 (1926) (Brandeis, J.,
concurring); Farrington v. Tokushige, 273 U.S. 284, 298-99 (1926); Yu Cong Eng
v. Trinidad, 271 U.S. 500, 526-27 (1926). The cases also were cited occasionally in support of the incorporation of the first amendment into the fourteenth. See, e.g., Poe
v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 544 (1960) (Harlan, J., dissenting); Thomas v. Collins,
323 U.S. 516, 531 (1944); Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 164 (1943). After
1937, Meyer and Pierce were most frequently cited in dissenting opinions calling for
the revival of the Lochner doctrine. See, e.g., Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 517
(1960) (Douglas, J., dissenting); id. at 543-44 (Harlan, J., dissenting); Minersville
School Dist. v. Gobitis, 310 U.S. 586, 606 (1939) (Stone, J., dissenting). Only one
Supreme Court decision issued between 1926 and the 1960's cites Meyer or Pierce
for parental rights and family autonomy. Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158 (1944),
cites both Pierce and Meyer, but does so in a decision that significantly narrows
parental rights and family autonomy. See infra text accompanying notes 93-115.
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process. Griswold v. Connecticut'" began a line of cases invalidating
state restrictions on contraception and abortion. Since Griswold, the
Supreme Court has handed down a number of opinions delineating
the boundaries of parental autonomy."
Two recent cases exemplify current Supreme Court doctrine
regarding the rights and legal relationships which exist within the
autonomous family. Both decisions were written by Chief Justice
Burger, both rely heavily on Pierce and Meyer, and both clearly subordinate the rights of the child to those of his parents within the family.
In Wisconsin v. Yoder,' 2 members of an Amish sect had been
convicted of violating a Wisconsin statute which required school attendance until age sixteen. Amish parents only allowed their children
to attend school through the eighth grade. The Amish refused to send
their children to high school because they believed that exposing
teenagers to a secular education, especially in consolidated schools
with a high proportion of non-Amish pupils, would endanger the salvation of parents and children alike.' 3
The Amish argued, and the Court agreed, that the first amendment right to the free exercise of religion included the right to the
continued existence of their sect.' 4 The Court found that the very
existence of the Amish depended upon their ability to keep their
children out of secular high schools." The Court therefore held that
the right of the Amish parents to guide their children's development
and to maintain their community substantially outweighed the state's
interest in requiring one or two additional years of education for the
Amish children.'"
The Court dismissed the contention that the first amendment free
exercise rights of the children were being subordinated to those of
the parents. 7 It noted that there was no evidence suggesting that the
children opposed their parents on this issue; however, even had such
evidence existed, the Court indicated it would have reached the same
50. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
51. See, e.g., Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584 (1979); Zablocki v.
U.S. 374 (1978); Quilloin v. Walcott, 434 U.S. 246 (1978); Moore v.
Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494 (1977); Planned Parenthood of Cent. Mo.
428 U.S. 52 (1976); Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
52. 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
53. State v. Yoder, 49 Wis. 2d 430, 435-37, 182 N.W.2d 539, 541
406 U.S. 205 (1972).
54. Yoder, 406 U.S. at 218-19.
55. Id. at 211.
56. Id. at 222.
57. Id. at 229-31.

Redhail, 434
City of East
v. Danforth,
(1971), aff'd,
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decision. 5 The majority opinion stated that any consideration of the
children's rights of free exercise would be "an intrusion" into a hitherto protected area of family life which would give rise to "grave questions of religious freedom" and "call into question traditional concepts of parental control over the religious upbringing and education
of their minor children.""'
Chief Justice Burger used strikingly similar language in the
majority opinion in Parham v. J.R. 6' Parham concerned the constitutionality of a Georgia statute which allowed children to be committed as "voluntary patients" upon the application of a parent or
guardian and a finding of mental illness by the superintendent of the
state hospital to which they were committed.6 1 The statute did not
provide for a pre-commitment hearing before an impartial tribunal.
The Court held that the statute did not violate the due process rights
of the committed children.6 2
In terms of the development of the theory of family autonomy,
Parham's significance lies not so much in its holding as in some of
the language Chief Justice Burger used to justify it.63 Much of the
opinion centers around a supposed, historically deep-rooted concept
of the family "as a unit with broad parental authority over minor
children" in Western society, based on a "presumption that parents
possess what a child lacks in maturity, experience and capacity for
judgment required for making life's difficult decisions.""
Taken in tandem, Yoder and Parham illustrate why the Lochner
6
doctrine fell on hard times during the 1930's. With little constitutional 1
or historical6 6 basis, the Court used these cases as an opportunity to
58. Id.at 230-32.
59. Id.at 231.
60. 442 U.S. 584 (1979).
61. Id. at 588 n.3.
62. Id.at 620-21.
63. Although three justices (Justices Brennan, Marshall and Stevens) joined in
a partial dissent, they agreed with the majority that no pre-commitment hearing was
needed for children whose parents sought to commit them to state hospitals. They
felt, however, that the Georgia statute insufficiently protected those children who
were already wards of the state at the time of the commitment. Id. at 635-39 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
64. Id. at 602.
65. Although the majority opinion also cites Yoder, Meyer and Pierce form
the constitutional basis for the Chief Justice's theory of parental rights. Yet, plentiful dictum to the contrary, Meyer and Pierce are substantive due process cases
or, at most, cases standing for the partial incorporation of the Bill of Rights into
the fourteenth amendment.
66. Characteristically, the Chief Justice cites Blackstone rather than historians
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enshrine in the Constitution two highly controversial presumptions
about the parent-child relationship: an adult acts more wisely than
a child, and a parent always acts in his child's best interest because
ultimately the best interests of the parents are the best interests of
the child. The opinions also contain an unstated third presumption:

children differ qualitatively rather than quantitatively from adults in
maturity and judgment. In the reality mirrored in these opinions, a
child achieves maturity suddenly at age eighteen instead of growing
gradually into it. One gets no sense of variation among children, and

no sense that a typical fifteen year old is probably more "adult"
than a typical ten year old.

The most important flaw is the assumption that a child's best
interests necessarily coincide with those of his parent. One need not

presume a parent unfit to acknowledge that the older a child becomes,
the more his actual and perceived interests will diverge from those
of his parents. Despite their rhetoric, neither Yoder nor Parham
demonstrates an understanding of the real-life complexity of parentchild relations. The opinions evoke an idealized and probably mythical
family, strikingly reminiscent of the plantations described by apologists for the ante-bellum South. 7
In deciding cases involving family issues, the Burger Court has

been reluctant to establish any broad constitutional principles for the
lower courts to apply. 68 It seemingly has preferred ad hoc opinions

replete with sweeping dictum about family autonomy and/or the
parent's right to control his child's development regardless of the child's

desires.

to support his views. Parham, 442 U.S. at 602. This is not the place for an extended
discussion of the last two millenia of the Western family, but two general points need
to be made. First, as late as the early nineteenth century, children joined the work
force, as adults, between the ages of seven and thirteen. Indeed, historians generally
agree with the pathbreaking Phillippe Aries that pre-industrial society had no separate
concept of childhood; children as young as seven or eight were treated in most respects
as adults. P. ARms, CENTURIES OF CHILDHOOD (1962). Moreover, even if Chief Justice
Burger's picture of history were correct, appeals to historical tradition are tricky
at best. Slavery was, after all, an integral part of the American historical tradition
for over two centuries, and race prejudice for centuries more.
67. See, e.g., C. SYDNOR, SLAVERY iN Mississippi (1935).
68. One commentator has attributed the narrowness of the Burger Court's
family-oriented decisions (including abortion and women's rights) to the middle class
values held by the Court's majority. Tushnet, "' . . And Only Wealth Will Buy
You Justice"*-Some Notes on the Supreme Court. 1972 Term, 1974 Wis. L. REV.
177. Tushnet argues that most decisions focus on issues "that particularly concerned
their wives and friends." Id. at 181.

[1983:59)

PARENTAL AUTONOMY AND CHILDREN'S RIGHTS

FAMILY AUTONOMY-SCHOLARLY

SUPPORT

Many commentators share the Burger Court's belief that children's
rights should be subordinated to family autonomy.69 Over the past
decade, scholarly attacks on both the propriety and the efficacy of

most state intervention to resolve intra-family disputes have been

increasing.7" This disenchantment with the role of the state is not
limited to family issues, but is linked to the important, if amorphous,
movement generally known as "neo-conservatism."I'
Leading the charge against state intervention in family life is the
team of Joseph Goldstein, Anna Freud and Albert J. Solnit." Three
factors explain the widespread impact of their work. First, unlike many
other scholars, they present a single, comprehensive theory to govern
the relationship between parents, their children and the state. Scholars
and judges alike have been forced to deal with their theory because
it provides such a seductively simple solution to seemingly intractable
legal and social problems. Second, the three are not just law professors who have retained some psychological patter from dimly
remembered undergraduate encounters with Sigmund Freud. All are
trained psychiatrists or psychoanalysts, and one is a lawyer as well.7
In addition to their impressive credentials and the monolithic scope
of their work, the breath-taking extremism of many of their posi69. See, e.g., E. SCHUR, RADICAL NON-INTERVENTION (1973). Although Schur
primarily focuses on the juvenile justice system, especially status offenses, his analysis
leads logically to a position of opposition to state intervention in family life.
70. See, e.g., Mnookin, Child-Custody Adjudication: JudicialFunctions in the
Face of Indeterminacy, 39 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 226, 265-68 (1975). Mnookin
argues essentially that only recognition of the primacy of the family and de-emphasis
on the role of the state will lead to better child custody decisions.
71. At its most basic, "neo-conservatism" (or perhaps more accurately, "neoliberalism") stems from a growing disenchantment among liberals with the statist
policies that liberalism has championed since the New Deal. One persistent neoconservative theme (found throughout E. ScHUR, supra note 69) is that liberal policies
have created a host of new problems in the process of trying, often ineffectually,
to solve old ones. For an insightful analysis of the impact of neo-conservatism on
the development of a theory of parental rights, see Dickens, The Modern Function
and Limits of Parental Rights, 97 LAW Q. REv. 462 (1981).
72. The seminal works by these authors are J. GOLDSTEIN, A. FREUD & A.
SOLNIT, BEYOND THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE CHILD (2d ed. 1979) [hereinafter cited
as BEYOND] and its sequel, J. GOLDSTEIN, A. FREUD & A. SOLNIT, BEFORE THE BEST
INTERESTS OF THE CHILD (1979) [hereinafter cited as BEFORE].

73. Anna Freud is the director of a child therapy clinic in the United Kingdom
and is the daughter of Sigmund Freud. Joseph Goldstein is a law professor at Yale
University and a psychoanalyst. Albert J. Solnit is a professor of medicine, also
at Yale, and is both a physician and a psychoanalyst. BEFORE, supra note 72, at 287-88.
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tions attracts attention. For example, the trio argues that custody determination should extinguish completely the legal relationship between
the non-custodial parent and his child."'
The theoretical foundations of Goldstein, Freud and Solnit's
theories emerge most clearly in the so-called "Hampstead-Haven Child
Placement Code."7 " This "Code" contains the essence of the authors'
views concerning the proper relationships between parent, child and
state, views strikingly similar to those of the Burger Court.
The Code begins by defining such crucial terms as "Child,"
"Adult," "Parent," and "Parental Autonomy." A close examination of these definitions reveals three central postulates: a rigid separation between the concepts of adult and child; a presumption of total
identity of the interests of children and parents; and an assumption
that state involvement impermissibly violates family integrity in all
but the rarest cases.
For these commentators, "Adult" and "Child" constitute two
mutually exclusive categories. "[Blecause he is 18 years or older" the
law should presume an adult "to be independent and capable of
making decisions for himself." 76 Conversely, "because he is less than
18 years of age" the law should presume a child to be "incapable
of making decisions for himself."" It is clear from the context of
their work that the group treats these presumptions as all but
irrebutable. 8
The rest of their theory flows inexorably from these two definitions and a deep, almost implacable, hostility toward the state. At
the core of their theory is "Parental Autonomy," that being "the
right of Parents to raise their Children as they think best, in accordance with their own notions of child rearing."7 9 Parental Autonomy,
in turn, forms the basis for the authors' ultimate goal of "Family
Integrity" which combines "the Parents' right to Autonomy, a Child's
right to Autonomous Parents, and family privacy.''80

BEYOND, supra note 72, at 38.
75. Id. at 97-101; BEFORE, supra note 72, at 187-96.
76. BEFORE, supra note 72, at 188 (emphasis added).
77. Id. (emphasis added).
78. See, e.g., id. at 127: "Children by definition cannot be free of an adult's
control." (emphasis added). Goldstein, Freud and Solnit seem oddly silent on the
rights of parents under 18. Paragraph 10.4 of the Code defines "Parents" as "Adults
who have the rights and responsibility . . . to make decisions for their Child." Id.
at 188 (emphasis added). It seems only logical that minor parents cannot be "Parents"
according to their definition, which in turn leads to a host of conceptual and practical problems.
79. Id. at 189.
80. Id.

74.
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Goldstein, Freud and Solnit give to children only one discernible
right, the right to autonomous parents, that is, the right to be raised
by their parents without state interference. They label state intervention into the autonomous family as "Child Abuse" 8 unless the parents
have committed an act falling into one of their narrowly defined
"Grounds for Intervention" 8 which authorize state intrusion. Even
this notable group concedes that the state has a right to intervene
if parents abandon their children, inflict "serious bodily injury" on
them, or abuse them sexually.3 In the case of sexual abuse, they would
authorize no state intervention until the parent's conviction or acquittal
by reason of insanity."' Even in these extreme situations, these scholars
are reluctant to sanction state intervention. When parents physically
maltreat or sexually abuse their children, "intrusion" by the state
"may make a bad situation worse; indeed, it may turn a tolerable
or even a good situation into a bad one." 8 5
Goldstein, Freud and Solnit develop their theory of family
autonomy from a series of hypotheses about the early psychological
development of children. Their pivotal hypothesis centers on the extreme psychological vulnerability of small children.8 6 This vulnerability
creates a primary and critical need for continuity of care by one or
more psychological parents.87 Any interruption in this continuity of
81. Id. at 191.
82. Id. at 193-96. Indeed, the trio would allow a family to decide without outside participation the question of whether a healthy sibling should donate an organ
to another sibling in need of a transplant. Id. at 104-09. Although they limit this
parental discretion to situations where one sibling will certainly die, their refusal to
breach the wall of family autonomy in this situation leaves a medical determination
(the chances of death without a transplant) to lay parents. This policy is enshrined
in paragraph 30.8 of the Code which allows state intervention into a parental decision concerning medical care for a child only where medical experts agree that the
treatment is appropriate, withholding the treatment "will result in the child's death"
and the treatment will result in a chance for the child to have "normal healthy growth
or a life worth leading." Id. at 194 (emphasis added). Here again, the writers bar
intervention unless facts exist which cannot be brought out unless the state intervenes
in a forbidden manner.
83. Id. at 193-94.
84. Id. at 194. This fails to deal with the problem of what to do with a sexually abusing parent who cannot be convicted because of (1) the insufficiency of evidence,
(2) the unwillingness or inability of the child to testify, or of the other parent to
make him or her testify, (3) plea bargaining which leads to the parent pleading guilty
to a lesser offense, or (4) any of the other ways in which our less-than-perfect criminal
justice system allows the apparently guilty to escape conviction.
85. Id. at 13.
86 BEYOND, supra note 72, at 9-28.
87. Id. at 31-52.
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care is potentially damaging, especially to a young child, who is seldom
resilient enough to deal with a major trauma. 8
Thus stated, the basic theory seems reasonable, although many
psychologists would prefer to begin with a contrary premise, postulating
the resilience of most children. 9 The extremism of Goldstein, Freud
and Solnit flows from their position that any state intervention is an
interruption in the affected child's continuity of care. "When family
integrity is broken or weakened by state intrusion, [the child's] needs
are thwarted and his belief that his parents are omniscient and allpowerful is shaken prematurely. The effect on the child's developmental
progress is invariably detrimental." 0
Evaluating their theory requires a fundamental inquiry into the
correctness of their stark and unambiguous condemnation of state
intervention into the family. A postulate that state intervention into
the family invariably harms children presupposes the scientific validity
of the trio's psychoanalytic theory.' To date there has been no scientific validation of their hypothesis. 2
LIMITS ON PARENTAL AUTHORITY

Although the concept of parental autonomy vis-a-vis the state
has become dominant, the Supreme Court has failed to articulate a
constitutional theory delineating the relationship between parent, child
and state. This failure leaves undefined the precise circumstances under
which a court may properly limit parental authority. Any attempt
to identify the boundaries of parental autonomy must begin with Prince
v. Massachusetts.3 Although it is unclear to what degree Prince survives Yoder,9 ' courts continue to cite Prince for the proposition that
parental power over children may be limited by an overriding state
interest in protecting the health and welfare of minor children. 95
88. Id. at 32-34.
89. In a long and characteristically ad hominem footnote, Goldstein, Freud
and Solnit acknowledge that a number of psychologists disagree with many of their
basic premises but dismiss the work of these critics as "simplistic" and "reductionist."
BEFORE, supra note 72, at 199-202 n.10.
90. Id. at 9 (emphasis added).
91. See supra note 89.
92. For a devastating attack on the use of psychological evidence in custody
cases and on the scientific validity of psychological theory in general, see Okpaku,
Psychology: Impediment or Aid in Child Custody Cases, 29 RUTGERS L. Rv. 1117
(1976), especially at 1149-53.
93. 321 U.S. 158 (1944).
94. See infra notes 107-11 and accompanying text.
95. Yoder cited Prince as establishing the outer limits of parental autonomy.
Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 229-31 (1972).
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75

Prince arose in the context of widespread hostility toward
Jehovah's Witnesses during the 1940's.96 Mrs. Prince, a Jehovah's
Witness, was in the habit of selling various religious tracts on the
public streets of Brockton, Massachusetts." Her two sons and her
nine-year-old niece frequently joined her in this task.9" Unfortunately
for Mrs. Prince, Massachusetts law prohibited boys under twelve or
girls under eighteen from selling or offering to sell newspapers or
other periodicals in a public place. 99 Under the statute, both the supplier of the periodicals and the parent or guardian of the child could
be prosecuted if they knew that the child intended to sell the
material. '°

Mrs. Prince was convicted of furnishing her niece with the
periodicals and of permitting her to violate the state's child labor
laws.' °1 The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts affirmed the
conviction, holding that the state did not abridge the first amendment rights of either the child or her aunt.' 02 Mrs. Prince appealed
to the United States Supreme Court, arguing that the statute violated
both her first amendment right to the free exercise of her religion
and her fourteenth amendment due process right of parental
authority."0 3 The Supreme Court rejected her argument, holding that
both those rights, although important, had to be balanced against
the state's important interest in protecting the health and welfare of
minor children.'0 4 "[Nleither rights of religion nor rights of parenthood are beyond limitation. Acting to guard the general interest in
youth's well being, the state as parenspatriae may restrict the parent's
control . ..in many ... ways."' 03 The opinion contains a wealth

of similar language stressing the legitimate, far-reaching power of the
state to limit parental autonomy.10 6
Nevertheless, closer examination both of the case itself and of
its subsequent use by the Supreme Court reveals the aberrant nature
of Prince, at least with respect to the delineation of parental autonomy.
96. This point, all but ignored by the majority, is brought out forcefully in
the dissents. E.g., Prince, 321 U.S. at 174-76 (Murphy, I., dissenting).

97. Id.at 161-62.
98. Id.at 159, 161-62.
99. The pertinent statutes are quoted id. at 160.

100. Id. at 161.
101. Id.at 160.
102. Commonwealth v. Prince, 313 Mass. 223, 46 N.E.2d 755 (1943), aff'd, 321
U.S. 158 (1944).
103. Prince, 321 U.S. at 164.
104. Id.at 165-66.
105. Id. at 166 (footnotes omitted).
106. Id.at 166-70.
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Two factors limit the present day applicability of Prince. Prince is,
first of all, a case reflecting the Court's repudiation of substantive
due process as it applied to state regulation of social and economic

matters. The majority focused much of its attention on the fact that
the challenged statute regulated child labor, one of the classic targets

of the Court during the Lochner era."0 7
The second factor minimizing the present authority of Prince is

its ultimate subject matter: Jehovah's Witnesses. During the 1940's,
the Court had been inundated by a series of cases arising from a
growing clash between militant Witnesses and members of more traditional denominations.' 8 The Witnesses won several of these cases,
but the Court's patience seems to have been exhausted by the time
Prince came before it. The tone of the opinion was one of "here
we go again." The Court recited the facts in an almost jocular fashion
and offhandedly affirmed the Massachusetts decision."' Only the two
dissenting opinions dealt with the real issues in Prince. Pointing out
the majority's disregard of both the Constitution and recent precedent, Justice Murphy expressed his fear that Massachusetts was using

a facially neutral statute as "an instrument of oppression" against
members of a "militant and unpopular sect.""'

Justice Jackson agreed

that the decision lacked a constitutional basis and derided the majority's

contention that the primary issue in Prince was state regulation of

child labor.'
Perhaps because of its unique circumstances, most opinions citing
Prince either have narrowed its holding significantly or have relegated

it to string cites, often for contradictory propositions. More than any
107. Among evils most appropriate for such action are the crippling effects

of child employment, most especially in public places .... It is too late now

to doubt that legislation appropriately designed to reach such evils is within
the state's police power, whether against the parent's claim to control of the
child or one that religious scruples dictate contrary action.
Id. at 168-69.
108. These decisions focused on two major controversies. The first was the persistent refusal of Jehovah's Witnesses to salute the flag. Focusing on freedom of
speech rather than on freedom of religion, the Supreme Court held that no one could
be forced to salute the flag. West Virginia Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624
(1943) (overruling Minersville School Dist. v. Gobitis, 310 U.S. 586 (1940)). The other
series of Jehovah's Witnesses cases, like Prince, are solicitation cases and no consistent pattern emerged from these. See, e.g., Follett v. McCormick, 321 U.S. 573 (1944);
Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105 (1943); Largent v. Texas, 318 U.S. 418 (1943);
Jones v. Opelika, 316 U.S. 584 (1942).
109. Prince, 321 U.S. at 161-62.
110. Id. at 176 (Murphy, J., dissenting).
111. Id. at 176-77 (Jackson, J., dissenting).
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other case, Wisconsin v. Yoder" 2 calls into question the continued
viability of Prince. In preparing their briefs, both sides in Yoder viewed
Prince as the heart of the state's case. In fact, Wisconsin cited Prince
as controlling precedent in its petition for certiorari.II 3 It cited the
case six times in its brief, primarily for the proposition that a parent's
free exercise right had to give way to the state's significant interest
in the welfare and education of minor children."' The attorneys for
the Amish, of course, tried to ignore Prince. The respondent's brief
cited it only once, characterizing it as involving "the use of a child
to hawk magazines on city streets at night."" ' 5
The Court probably flabbergasted both sides by ruling for the
Amish without overruling Prince. It acknowledged that some might
interpret Prince as supporting Wisconsin's right to intervene to
guarantee the Amish children a right to an education adequate for
the modern world. ' 6 The Court rejected this view of Prince,
characterizing it as simply a child labor case." 7
The Chief Justice noted that the Supreme Court had already narrowed the scope of Prince significantly." 8 In Sherbert v. Verner," 9
the Court had reversed a South Carolina decision denying unemployment benefits to a Seventh Day Adventist who had refused to work
on Saturday. In doing so, the Court rejected South Carolina's argument that Sherbert's right to exercise her religion freely had to give
way to the state's interest in maintaining an effective unemployment
insurance system.' , ° Any other outcome, the state argued, would violate
the first amendment by establishing Seventh Day Adventism in South
Carolina. 2'
The Court held that a two-part balancing test applies to cases
like Sherbert.'2 The plaintiff must show that the statute or state action
imposes a substantial burden on a free exercise right. If such a burden
exists, only a compelling state interest can outweigh the plaintiff's
first amendment right. The majority cited Prince as holding that where
112. 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
113. Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 9, Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
114. Id.at 22-24.
115. Brief for Respondents in Opposition to Writ of Certiorari at 30, Yoder,
406 U.S. 205 (1972).
116. Yoder, 406 U.S. at 229.
117. Id.at 230.
118. Id.
119. 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
120. Id. at 407-08.
121. Id.at 409.
122. Id.at 403-09.
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first amendment rights are concerned, a state interest could be compelling only when the religious observance posed "some substantial
23
threat to public safety, peace or order."'1
The Court's reliance on Sherbert in Yoder raises two questions
which the majority opinion never resolved satisfactorily. First, unlike
Sherbert but like Prince, Yoder was not really concerned with the
state's power to regulate the religious practices of adults. Prince and
Yoder dealt with the right of parents to impose on their children not
only their religious beliefs, but also a way of life which flows from
those beliefs. Secondly, Yoder failed to address the extent to which
the state has a compelling interest in mandating secondary education
for minor children.
Yet Prince still survived, albeit in attenuated form. Yoder
acknowledged that "the power of the parent, even when linked to
a free exercise claim, may be subject to limitation under Prince if
it appears that parental decisions will jeopardize the health or safety
of the child.""'2 Moreover, Supreme Court opinions still cite Prince,
although all too frequently for contradictory propositions and in string
cites. 125

Notwithstanding Yoder's limitation of Prince, some cracks are
beginning to appear in the facade of the doctrine of parental
autonomy. The case of Phillip Becker represents one of the most striking recent examples of judicial rejection of parental autonomy in favor
of the child's best interest. Phillip is a fourteen-year-old boy suffering from Down's Syndrome.' 26 His parents institutionalized him at
123. Id. at 403. It is hard to see poor Mrs. Prince's activities in this light. The
chief inapplicability of Prince to Sherbert seems, however, to stem from the fact
that the real thrust of Prince was the ability of the state to limit children's first
amendment rights in situations where the rights of adults would clearly be protected.
"Concededly a statute or ordinance identical in terms with § 69, except that it would
be applicable to adults . . .would be invalid." Prince, 321 U.S. at 167.
124. Yoder, 406 U.S. at 233-34.
125. Compare, e.g., Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 385 (1978), and Carey
v. Population Servs. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678, 685 (1977) (personal decisions of individuals
relating to family relationships are to be made without unjustified government interference) with Hurrah Indep. School Dist. v. Martin, 440 U.S. 194, 198 (1979)
(per curiam), and Kelley v. Johnson, 425 U.S. 238, 247 (1976) (there is a "presumption of legislative validity [for] state choices designed to promote . . .aims within
the cognizance of the State's police power"). Perhaps the oddest of these cites is
in Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55 (1979) (a voting rights case), where Justice Marshall used Prince in a string cite to show the existence of a constitutionally protected
right of privacy. Id. at 114 n.9 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
126. For the factual background to the Becker case, see In re Phillip B., 92
Cal. App. 3d 796, 156 Cal. Rptr. 48 (1979), cert. denied sub nom. Bothman v. Warren B., 445 U.S. 949 (1980); In re Becker, 7 FAm. L. REP. (BNA) 2647 (Super.
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birth. Phillip also suffers from a congenital heart defect which, if
not corrected, will cause progressive physical deterioration and Phillip's
eventual slow and painful death.
Physicians first diagnosed Phillip's condition when he was six,
but his parents consistently refused to authorize corrective surgery.
The California courts have been involved with Phillip's situation since
1979. Their involvement began with an unsuccessful petition seeking
to declare Phillip a "dependent child of the court. '" 127 It ended two
years later in a successful suit which removed Philip from the custody
of his biological parents and placed him in the custody of the Heaths,
a couple that the trial court found to be Phillip's psychological
parents. 128
Phillip's journey through the courts began with a characteristic
paean to the doctrine of parental autonomy. Faced with the prospect
that Phillip would die a slow and lingering death without surgery,
social service agencies sought a court order for treatment.' 2 9 The trial
court dismissed the petition on the ground that there was "no clear
and convincing evidence to sustain this petition."' 30 The California
Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the constitutionally protected
right to family autonomy gave parents, in all but the most extreme
cases, discretion to determine the appropriateness of medical treatment for their children. 3 '
In re Phillip B. may represent the high water mark of the extreme
version of the parental rights doctrine. The court's ruling allowed
parents who had institutionalized their child at birth to wield a veto
power over attempts to improve the child's life. The decision exalted
parental autonomy to the point that parents had the right to conCt. Aug. 7, 1981); Heath v. Becker, 8 FAM. L. REP. (BNA) 2017 (Cal. App. Oct.
19, 1981); Will, A Trip Toward Death, NEWSWEEK, Aug. 31, 1981, at 72; Will,
The Case of Phillip B., NEWSWEEK, April 14, 1980, at 112.

127. In re Phillip B., 92 Cal. App. 3d at 799, 156 Cal. Rptr. at 49-50.
128. Heath, 8 FAM. L. REP. (BNA) 2017 (Cal. App. Oct. 19, 1981).
129. In re Phillip B., 92 Cal. App. 3d at 799, 156 Cal. Rptr. at 49-50.
130. Id. at 803, 156 Cal. Rptr. at 50.
131. Id. at 801, 156 Cal. Rptr. at 50. The court supported this contention with
a string cite going on to the next page. Leading off the cite was a case protecting
the private possession of pornography (United States v. Orito, 413 U.S. 139 (1973)),
another making restrictions on abortions unconstitutional during the first trimester
of pregnancy (Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973)), as well as several other cases
dealing with contraception in one form or another. The court also cited the usual
panoply of "family autonomy" cases, including Yoder, Pierce and Meyer. It also
included Prince, which one would think would be the last case a court would use
in sanctioning a parent's right to condemn his child to slow death. In re Phillip
B., 92 Cal. App. 3d at 801, 156 Cal. Rptr. at 50-51.
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demn their child to a painful and drawn out death. Unsettling as
this position might be, it is fully consistent with the non-interventionism
2
preached by Goldstein, Freud and Solnit.'1
Luckily for Phillip, his advocates did not give up hope. Two years
later, another court sat to decide whether Phillip's parents could limit
the duration and quality of his remaining years.' 3 3 This time, the trial
judge ruled that they could not. He held that the Beckers had so
damaged Phillip as to forfeit their right to custody.' 34 He also held
that another couple, Warren and Patricia Heath, had become Phillip's
psychological parents. The Heaths had known Phillip since he was
five. They visited him weekly, regularly took him to their home for
overnight visits and generally gave him the love that his biological
parents were reluctant or unable to give him. '
There is a fitting irony in the judge's use of Goldstein, Freud
and Solnit's concept of psychological parenthood to limit the doctrine of parental autonomy. The chief problem with the decision is
that, faced with a Solomonic choice, the judge did cut the baby in
half. The Heaths will be glorified foster parents, the Beckers will remain Phillip's legal parents, and a court order will still be necessary
before Phillip can have any corrective surgery. Neither the trial court
nor the court of appeals addressed the issue of the legal rights of
the biological parents should the Heaths raise the issue of corrective
surgery for Phillip.

132. In what may be the most controversial section of BEFORE, supra note 72,
Goldstein, Freud and Solnit suggest that state intervention compelling unwilling parents
to give their children medical care is justified only when: (1) the procedure is safe
and effective; (2) the child would certainly die without the treatment; and (3) the
treatment will give the child "normal healthy growth, a life worth living." Id. at
91-92. Even here, however, the noted authors try to cast doubt on the state's right
to intervene, both by making the grounds for intervention as narrow as possible
and by disparaging their opponents' motives. They dismiss those who advocate state
intervention to protect the lives and health of children as physicians with an "unqualified value preference for life" (id. at 96) or "health department doctors" with
"rescue fantasies." Id. at 105. If the proposed medical procedure cannot meet all
three criteria and especially if it will not ensure the affected child "a life worth living,"
Goldstein, Freud and Solnit would deny to anyone but the parents the moral right
to choose life rather than death for the child. All of this is in the name of protecting
the parents' right to autonomy and the child's right to autonomous parents. It is
hard to imagine how upholding a parental sentence of death will promote family
autonomy, or how intervening to keep Phillip Becker from dying a painful and useless
death could constitute "Child Abuse" by the state. Id. at 191.
133. In re Becker, 7 FAM. L. REP. (BNA) 2647 (Super. Ct. Aug. 7, 1981).
134. Id. at 2648.
135. Id. at 2647-48.
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A very different challenge to the doctrine of parental autonomy
has developed out of what might be called "transnational custody
disputes." Increasing numbers of Americans have married foreign
spouses and many of these marriages have ended in divorce. No
unusual problems are likely to arise if there are no children, the
American spouse gets custody, or the non-American custodial spouse
remains in the United States. A significant new issue does arise if
the custodial spouse wants to return to his or her homeland with the
children.
Under such circumstances, either the child or the non-custodial
parent is likely to oppose the move and challenge it, hoping to force
the custodial parent either to relinquish custody or remain in the United
States. Courts confronted with this situation must choose between
the presumptive right of the custodial spouse to choose his or her
domicile and the less well-established right of the child to choose to
remain in the United States.
A two-step analysis provides the best solution to this problem.
The court must first determine whether a child has the right, constitutional or not, to override the custodial parent's decision to move
to another country. To the extent that the court finds such a right
to exist, it must then decide whether the particular child is sufficiently mature to merit judicial recognition of his preferences. Two such
cases arose recently with strikingly similar facts and diametrically
opposed results. Analysis of the opinions shows the most important
variable to be judicial willingness to consider seriously whether the
child could make a thoughtful, intelligent choice of which parent should
have custody and in what country.
In Bergstrom v. Bergstrom,'3 6 the father was an American Foreign
Service officer, the mother a Norwegian. Their daughter, Ida, was
born in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, in 1971. In 1979, a court in the District
of Columbia granted the couple a divorce and awarded the mother
custody of Ida.' 37 The father immediately filed lawsuits in North
Dakota. He went into United States district court to enjoin enforcement of the District of Columbia decree.' 38 He also filed suit in state
court, seeking to overturn the District of Columbia decree and asking
for custody of, Ida.' 3 9
The district court granted the father's decree based on its find136.
(8th Cir.
137.
138.
guardian
139.

478 F. Supp. 434 (D.N.D. 1979), vacated and remanded, 623 F.2d 517
1980); 296 N.W.2d 490 (N.D. 1980).
Bergstrom, 296 N.W.2d at 492.
Bergstrom, 478 F. Supp. at 436. The suit was filed in Ida's name by a
ad litem.
Bergstrom, 296 N.W.2d at 492-93.
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ing that the father was likely to prevail on the merits in state court
and irreparable harm was likely to ensue were no injunction to issue.'4 °
The court based its decision largely on its conclusion that eight-yearold Ida was "of sufficient age, discretion and intelligence to exercise
an intelligent preference" for life in the United States with her father.'"'
The Eighth Circuit vacated the opinion on the ground that the father's
failure to exhaust state remedies left the federal courts without
jurisdiction. 2
The drama was winding to a close in the state courts at the same
time. A North Dakota trial judge agreed that the District of Columbia court had decided correctly the issue of custody.' 3 He held that
Ida's interests would be served best by giving her mother sole custody.
He also held that, given Ida's youth, her right to live in the United
States necessarily had to be subordinate to her mother's right to live
44
where she chose.'
The Supreme Court of North Dakota reversed.'4 5 It awarded joint
custody to the parents on two conditions: that the mother remain
in the United States and that Ida get psychological counselling. ' 4 The
court held that Ida was fully capable of deciding her own best interests in spite of her young age. In reaching .this conclusion, the court
focused on two factors: Ida's above-average intelligence and maturity,
and her wide experience in living in different parts of the world. 14
She had lived both in Norway and the United States. She therefore
had an intelligent basis upon which to make a decision.
Faced with substantially similar facts, the Seventh Circuit reached
a wholly opposite result. In Schleiffer v. Meyers,'" an American had
also married a Scandinavian, this time a Swede. Their child, Harald,
was born in Sweden, the couple's marital domicile. By 1976, the marriage was troubled. It had fallen apart by early 1978, despite at least
one reconciliation attempt. Four separate divorce suits were
instituted.' 4 9 The only clearly valid one was a Swedish decree of
February, 1979, which granted a divorce and gave the wife custody
140. Bergstrom, 478 F. Supp. at 436.
141. Id. at 439.
142. Bergstrom, 623 F.2d at 520-21.
143. Bergstrom, 296 N.W.2d at 492-93.
144. Id. at 493.
145. Id. at 490.
146. Id. at 491-92.
147. Id. at 496-97.
148. 644 F.2d 656 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 823 (1981).
149. Schleiffer, 644 F.2d at 658-59. One of these was an ex parte Dominican
divorce decree of which the mother learned two years after the fact.
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had taken Harald to the United States in 1978
of Harald. The father
1 50
where he remained.
The case came into the federal courts when Harald's guardian
ad litem sought to enjoin Indiana enforcement of the Swedish custody
decree. The United States District Court for the Northern District
of Indiana dismissed the petition and the Seventh Circuit affirmed,
both on procedural and substantive grounds."'5 Like the Eighth Circuit in Bergstrom, the Seventh Circuit noted that the plaintiff had
not exhausted his state remedies and therefore, federal action was
not ripe.' " In dictum, the court also delivered a scathing attack on
child should have any right to decide
the notion that an eleven-year-old
53
where he should live.'
At the core of the opinion was the court's assertion that a child
is unable "to make critical decisions in an informed mature
manner.""'5 This assertion might have been palatable had it been less
broad, or supported by meaningful evidence. The Supreme Court has
recognized that minors can make some critical decisions in holding
that a minor has the right to get an abortion without her parents'
consent.' 5 The Seventh Circuit's most disturbing conclusion is that
it would be improper even to ask Harald about his preferences. Citing
Parham v. J.R.,' 56 the court held that "it would be even more
traumatic for Harald to be brought before the court in a formalized
fact finding hearing, or even before the federal district judge in
chambers, to determine his actual preference as between his parents."'5 7
This quote from Schleiffer brings into focus many of the problems
generated by the parental rights doctrine. The Schleiffer opinion is
conclusory, extreme in its language and, in the final analysis, unwilling even to consider the possibility that a child may have a valid opinion
as to his or her "best interests."
DECIDING IN RE POLOVCHAK-A

SUGGESTED

SUBSTANTIVE BASIS

To the extent that the Supreme Court has expressed a coherent
justification for limiting children's constitutional rights, it has done
150.
151.
152.
153.
154.
155.
156.
157.

Id. at 659.
Id. at 656-67.
Id. at 665.
Id. at 661-62.
Id. at 661.
Planned Parenthood of Cent. Mo. v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52 (1976).
442 U.S. 584 (1979).
Schleiffer, 644 F.2d at 662 (emphasis added).
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so in Bellotti v. Baird.'" Bellotti set forth three reasons why children's
constitutional rights may validly be limited: "the peculiar vulnerability
of children; their inability to make critical decisions in an informed,
mature manner; and the importance of the parental role in child
rearing.""' Although all three are relevant to a proper disposition
of Walter's case, any justification of Walter's right to defy his parents'
decision to return to the Soviet Union turns on the resolution of two
basic issues. First, is Walter, like Ida Bergstrom, more capable than
the average American child his age of rationally deciding in which
country he prefers to live? Second, have his parents forfeited their
normal parental right to choose where the family will live if, by enforcement of that choice, Walter will be exposed to significant danger?
Most who advocate subordinating a child's rights to those of his
parents focus on the child's putative inability to make a rational determination of his own interests. Although perhaps true with respect
to late-twentieth century America, the generalization does not hold
true historically and is not necessarily true in all societies today. History
is replete with thirteen and fourteen year olds, "children" by today's
terminology, who took charge of their own lives. 6 ' Moreover, even
today, many societies expose their youth to the "real world" and
require them to assume responsibilities at a much earlier age than
does the United States.
The United States and the Soviet Union differ in many significant respects. For a Soviet youth, perhaps the most salient difference
is in the treatment of children in the two societies, especially in the
area of education. As is true of other areas of Soviet life, education
is highly politicized. Political indoctrination begins in the day care
centers and kindergartens which most Soviet children attend between
the ages of three and seven. 6 ' This indoctrination continues and in158. 443 U.S. 622 (1979).
159. Id. at 634.
160. Up until the nineteenth century, British naval officers (and those of other
countries as well) generally began their careers as 12- and 13-year-old midshipmen,
with promotion to lieutenant often coming by age 17. Perhaps the classic example
of the independent "child" was Jenghiz Khan who was expelled from his tribe along
with his mother and younger brothers when his father died. He had attained the
ripe old age of 13. By the time he was 20, he was a powerful war leader well on
the way to creating an empire which included half of Asia. See R. GROUSSET, THE
EMPIRE OF THE STEPPES 199-200 (1970).
161. H. SMITH, THE RussiAs 159 (1976). Hedrick Smith spent several years
in the Soviet Union as the Moscow correspondent of the New York Times in the
early 1970's. Unlike most Westerners in the Soviet Union, he enrolled his children
in Soviet schools and thus had a unique opportunity to examine their operation.
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6'
tensifies throughout a child's compulsory ten years of education.
American observers have also noted the extreme rigidity of Soviet
schools as compared to the openness of even the most "traditional"
American schools. In Soviet schools, typically, there is only one correct way to do something and children are expected to master it. The
63
teaching of art is perhaps the best example of this.' In general, Soviet
schools seek to accomplish two purposes: to create ideologically sound
6
citizens and to cram their students with a maximum of information.'
The schools emphatically do not seek to create independent, critical
thinkers.
The stress on ideology, discipline and order is not just confined
to school hours; it also pervades children's after-school activities.
Depending on their ages, all children are expected to belong either
to the Octobrists or the Young Pioneers.' 5 These organizations have
no exact counterparts in the United States, but their overall effect
is to combine heavy doses of propaganda with more "fun" types of
children's activities.
At fourteen, membership in the party youth becomes more voluntary, but also more onerous. Membership in the Komsomols is essential for those wanting a higher education and for university students
who want good jobs upon graduation.' 66 Walter's awareness of the
Komsomols was apparent at his hearing because he cited their absence
in the United States as one of the most positive differences between
the two societies.' 67 Deciding whether or not to join the Komsomols
would have been especially acute for Walter had he stayed in the
Soviet Union. Walter's Christianity is incompatible with membership

162. Id. at 153.

163. In one kindergarten Smith observed, student art was judged by the degree
to which a student was able to make an identical copy of the model the teacher
had furnished. The student had to reproduce as exactly as possible both the drawing
and the colors of the original. Id. at 160.
164. Id. at 186.
165. Id. at 161-62. The Octobrists enroll children under the age of 10, the Young
Pioneers children 10 to 14, those in the fourth to the seventh grade. Twenty-five
million children belonged to the Pioneer organization in 1974, "nearly all" those
of the inclusive age groups. J. HouGH & M. FAiNSOD, HOW THE SovIET UNION Is
GOVERNED 299 (1979).
166. Upon graduation from the Young Pioneers, a 14 year old is eligible to
join the Komsomols (Communist Union of Youth) until he is 25; he is also eligible
for full party membership at 18. Approximately 60% of eligible Soviet youth belong
to the Komsomols. J. HOUGH & M. FAINSOD, supra note 165, at 300. Much higher
percentages of students belong: 76% of those in regular secondary schools, 87070
of those in specialized secondary schools and 940 of those in higher education.
Id. at 620 n.87.
167. Polovchak Brief, supra note 1, at 27.
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in the Komsomols. He would have been forced to choose one over
the other.' 68
To some extent, the issues of Walter's Komsomol membership
and his ability to get higher education may be moot. In large measure,
Soviet working class children from small provincial schools do not
have access to higher education today, even in the absence of Walter's
twin disabilities of being a Christian and a western Ukrainian. 6'9
Without higher education, social mobility in the Soviet Union is almost
impossible. On the other hand, American society's almost limitless
opportunity for higher education immediately strikes immigrants.
Moreover, political tests do not limit its availability.
Walter had spent six months in the United States before running
away from his parents to avoid a return to the Soviet Union. Although
a short time absolutely, it was more than enough time for Walter
to be able to choose rationally between his available options. Even
a twelve-year-old Soviet citizen has the political sophistication to
evaluate the Soviet and American systems and to decide where he
wants to live. Certainly Walter had at least the same ability to make
a rational decision as the North Dakota Supreme Court imputed to
Ida Bergstrom.' 70
So too, Walter arguably was in a better position to compare Soviet
and American life than either of his parents. Unlike a Soviet school
child, a Soviet adult has the ability to insulate himself from all but
the most pressing political and ideological pressures. This is especially
true if the adult is a worker possessing no career ambitions. Mikhail
Polovchak could expect few rewards in the Soviet Union. He seems
not to have sought them anyway.
Moreover, Mr. and Mrs. Polovchak's peculiar background makes
it unlikely that they, as youths, experienced political indoctrination
comparable to that to which their children were subjected. Mikhail
Polovchak was born in 1938, his wife Anna in 1940. They grew up
in the western Ukraine, an area that had been Polish until 1939, under
Soviet occupation from 1939 to 1941 and then under German occupa168. As branches of the Communist Party, youth groups are avowedly atheist

and combat religiousity among their members. As an extreme example, Pravda
reported in 1962 that a mother had lost custody of her children because she interfered

with their membership in the Young Pioneers and forced them to learn prayers. H.
GEIGER, THE FAMILY IN SOVIET RussIA 266 (1968).

169. Now that the Soviet intelligentsia has become large enough to replenish
itself, higher education in the Soviet Union has become increasingly class stratified,

with most slots in the universities going to children of the intelligentsia rather than
to working class children. H. SMITH, supra note 161, at 157-58.

170. Bergstrom v. Bergstrom, 296 N.W.2d 490, 496-97 (N.D. 1980).
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tion until 1945.'" Following that, the western Ukraine was the center
of an anti-Soviet guerilla struggle which lasted until about 1950.172
Therefore, the elder Polovchaks grew up at a time and in a place
where Soviet control either did not exist or was shaky at best. As
a consequence, they have escaped much of the systematic indoctrination endemic in the Soviet Union today. It would therefore be hard
for the Polovchaks to understand their children's reluctance to return
to an environment which, although materially more prosperous than
the Polovchaks had experienced here, was also more regimented.
Walter also probably has a better understanding of the American
system than his parents. The Polovchaks' six months in the United
States were spent working at menial, physically demanding jobs. They
spoke little or no English. They lived in a closed Ukrainian community which had little contact with the wider American society. In
short, they experienced all the adjustment problems that immigrants
typically have in coming to the United States, along with the extra
disadvantage of coming from the Soviet Union."7 3 Walter, on the other
hand, attended American schools, learned English and has begun to
assimilate to American society. At this point, Walter is probably better
able than his parents to compare the two systems and decide rationally
in which he wants to live.
Moreover, should his parents prevail, forcing him to return to
the Soviet Union, Walter would be in some danger. By his statements
and actions, Walter has certainly violated article 70 of the Criminal
Code, which addresses anti-Soviet agitation and propaganda.1 7 " A
number of recent cases establish that statements like Walter's, causing
embarrassment to the Soviet government, are more than enough to
sustain a conviction under article 70.' 7 Moreover, article 5 of the
171. See Bociurkiw, supra note 17, at 82.

172. Id. at 89.
173. For a general discussion of some of the difficulties faced by immigrants

to the United States, see UNITED STATES COMM'N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, supra note 16,
at 1-126.
174. Article 70 defines "anti-Soviet" in general terms as including "defaming"

the Soviet Union with "slanderous fabrications." Criminal Code of the Russian Soviet

Federated Socialist Republic (RSFSR), RSFSR CUm. CODE art. 70 in SOVIET CRIMINAL
LAW AND PROCEDURE: THE RSFSR CODES 180 (H. Berman, trans. ed. ann. 1966)

[hereinafter cited as RSFSR

CODES].

Both the Ukrainian (UKSSR) Criminal Code

and the Soviet Union's Law on Criminal Responsibility for Crimes Against the State
have identical provisions. UKSSR CrUM. CODE art. 62 in 1 W. BUTLER, COLLECTED
USSR AND CONSTITUENT REPUBLICS: UNION REPUBLIC LEGISLAVII-8 at 48 (1982); LAW ON CRIM. RESP. FOR CRIMES AGAINST THE STATE art.
7 in 4 W. BUTLER, COLLECTED LEGISLATION OF THE USSR AND CONSTITUENT
REPUBLICS: USSR, VII-8 at 5 (1979).
175. See J. HOUGH & M. FAINSOD, supra note 165, at 282-84 for recent examples
LEGISLATION OF THE

TION,
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Criminal Code allows Soviet citizens to be tried for offenses they commit outside the country."'
The effect of Walter's juvenile status on his criminal culpability
is unclear. On the one hand, juveniles are not subject to criminal
penalties for most acts committed before their sixteenth birthday. '
But they are subject to "compulsory measures of an educational
' A juvenile may be sent to a special
character" for those offenses. 78
labor camp for juveniles instead of a regular camp for adult
offenders. 79' It would most likely be little consolation to Walter to
know that he might be sent to an "educational" rather than a
"punitive" camp.
It is also important to realize that Walter could be tried as an
adult, even though the Code makes no provision for this in cases
of violations of article 70.18" Recent Soviet history has shown that
the regime does not always abide by its own established rules.
Punishments sometimes are imposed retroactively. This includes
execution of an individual convicted of a crime that did not carry
the death penalty at the time of its commission. 8'
Moreover, even if Walter is never formally convicted of violating
article 70, he could be subject to a variety of unappealing (and unappealable) "non-criminal" sanctions. Walter could be exiled administratively. That is, like Andrei Sakharov, he could be sent to live
in a particular location for as long as the government chose." 2 By
refusing to validate his internal passport, the regime could also bar
of prosecutions for violation of article 70 and other "anti-Soviet activity." Prosecutions seem most likely and punishments most severe when the image of the Soviet
Union abroad is affected.

176. RSFSR

CRIM. CODE

art. 5, in RSFSR

CODES,

supra note 174, at 146.

177. RSFSR CRIM. CODE art. 10, in id. at 147-48, lists those specific acts for
which persons between 14 and 16 may be subject to "criminal responsibility."
178. Id. at 148.
179. RSFSR CRIM. CODE art. 24, in id. at 152-53. The only concessions to
juveniles in the Soviet criminal justice system are that their sentence may be reduced
initially or after they have served at least one-third of their terms and their correction has been proved "by exemplary conduct and an honorable attitude toward labor
and education." RSFSR CRIM. CODE art. 55, in id. at 172-73.
180. RSFSR CRIM. CODE art. 10, in id. at 147.
181. The subjects of a classic example of retroactivity were two currency
speculators who were sentenced three times, the last time to death. Each of the latter
two sentences was under legislation that post-dated their arrests. The retroactive
death penalty seems to have resulted from the direct personal intervention of Nikita
Khrushchev, then Chairman of the Communist Party. Sharlet, The Communist Party
and the Administration of Justice in the USSR, in 3 SOVIET LAW AFTER STALIN
321, 359 (1979).
182. Sakharov, one of the founders of the Soviet nuclear program, has been
active in the human rights movement in the Soviet Union. He was recently ad-

[1983:59]

PARENTAL AUTONOMY AND CHILDREN'S RIGHTS

him from living in certain parts of the country, including most major
cities.' 8 3 In any event, Walter almost certainly would be barred from
higher education.
Thus, if the Polovchaks succeed in forcing Walter to return with
them to the Soviet Union, they would accomplish what the California courts refused to allow in Heath v. Becker."" A parent should
not be allowed to abuse his parental discretion by denying his child
the chance for a reasonably normal life, a life worth living.
CONCLUSION

If the case of In re Polovchak is ever decided on its merits, the
courts will be forced to make a difficult and unpalatable choice. To
rule for Walter's parents will be to validate a virtually unlimited parental right to make critical decisions against the wishes of a mature
minor child, even if those decisions will cause the child serious harm.
Perhaps unfortunately, the courts will probably be spared from making
the ultimate decision.
The controversy over Walter's fate has already dragged on for
over three years. Even though the Illinois Supreme Court has affirmed
the decision of the court of appeals returning Walter to his parents'
custody, it is inconceivable that Walter will be returned to the Soviet
Union. Because his parents remain in the Soviet Union, he remains
in the physical custody of the Cook County courts. Moreover, Walter's
attorneys have not exhausted his legal remedies. They have filed a
petition for a writ of certiorari in the United States Supreme Court.*
Litigation concerning the validity of the government's grant of asylum
to Walter is still pending in the federal courts. Even if Walter loses
in both these fora, he need simply run away again, thus reopening
the entire minor in need of supervision controversy and assuring himself
of at least another year or two in the United States.
In any event, time is on Walter's side. Walter ratifies his original
decision each day that he refuses to return to the Soviet Union. Now,
of course, he makes that decision as a sixteen year old rather than
as a twelve year old. Moreover, the longer the controversy drags on,
the more certain and severe Soviet reprisals will be if Walter ever
ministratively exiled from Moscow to Gorky even though no criminal charges were
ever filed. N.Y. Times, Jan. 23, 1980, at Al, col. 6.
183. Repeated violations of internal passport restrictions, including residence in
an area without permission, is punishable by up to a year in a labor camp. RSFSR
CRIM. CODE art. 198, in RSFSR CoDEs, supra note 174, at 22.
184. 8 FAm. L. REP. (BNA) 2017 (Cal. App. Oct. 19, 1981).
* The petition for a writ of certiorari was denied. 52 U.S.L.W. 3631 (U.S. Feb.
27, 1984) (No. 83-845).
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returns to the Soviet Union.
child in this case therefore
heavily in Walter's favor.
autonomy must give way to
where he chooses.

Any balance of the rights of parent and
inevitably must weigh more and more
In this case, the doctrine of parental
Walter's right to live a full and free life

